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Abstract

This paper explores the learning of raising verbs (e.g. seem), verbs which present
particular problems for the language learner. In addition to having highly abstract
lexical meanings, these verbs fail to provide some of the cues that guide learners
to the meanings of other verbs. The central problem explored here is that discovering the syntactic structure of a raising expression (in particular, discovering that
the main clause subject is not an argument of the raising verb) is not straightforward. Raising sentences like John seems to be happy are string-identical to control
sentences, such as John wants to be happy, but the two have very di erent structures. The focus of this paper is the question of how a learner could determine the
syntactic structure of raising expressions, and thus determine the syntactic and
semantic properties of raising verbs. The results of a series of experiments with
English-speaking adults are presented, as well as preliminary evidence from two
on-going experiments with children. The experiments suggest that good cues to
raising verbs or a raising structure come from expletive subjects (it, there) and
from the pairing of an inanimate subject with a stative lower predicate (the rock
hverbi to remain . . . ).
 This
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1 Introduction
This paper begins with the puzzle of how children learn the meanings of a
class of particularly hazardous verbs, the so-called Raising Verbs (e.g. seem).
These verbs, whose lexical meanings are highly abstract, do not give the
learner access to their meaning through some of the usual means. For instance, unlike more concrete actions such as `hitting' or `eating', `seeming'
(as such) cannot be observed in the world. Also, raising verbs do not select
any NP arguments and so do not stand in a semantic relationship with the
syntactic subject of the sentence (or any other NPs for that matter). Both
of these sources of information (observation of the environment, knowing the
meanings of a verb's arguments) are used by language learners as part of the
strategy of guring out the meanings of verbs.
For learning the meanings of raising verbs, one hopes that the solution
comes from a third type of information source that learners exploit in learning the meanings of verbs: the syntactic structure of the sentences in which
raising verbs occur. However, once again raising verbs present a challenge
to the learner: raising structures contain empty categories (the trace of the
raised subject)|the learner must parse this silent structure correctly. The
bulk of this paper explores the challenge of determining the syntactic structure of sentences involving raising verbs. At the end of the paper we will
return to the question of how, if a learner solves the syntactic puzzle, she
might begin to solve the semantic puzzle.
The class of raising predicates has few members, some of which are given
in (1).
appear
(1) seem
tend (to)
used (to)
happen (to) be likely
These predicates are de ned as a class by their failure to select (assign a
 -role to) any arguments. Underlyingly, these verbs take an empty subject
and select a propositional complement.
(2) [IP e [VP seem [CP=IP . . . ]]]
In languages that require the subject of the main clause to be overt
(such as English), the subject of the complement clause must raise to matrix
2

SpecIP, or else an expletive is inserted.1
(3)

a. [IP Johni [VP seems [IP ti to be happy ]]]
b. [IP It [VP seems [CP that John is happy ]]]

(4)

a.

IP
DP
e

b.

I

0

I

VP
V

IP

seems

John to be happy

IP
DP

I

0

Johni I

VP
V
seems

1 As

IP
ti

to be happy

is evident in the syntactic structures here, I assume a derivational syntactic framework, i.e. one that involves movement and raising. However, it is worth noting that the
assumption of movement is not crucial to the problems I am concerned with in this paper,
since in derivational and non-derivational frameworks alike, the main clause subject is semantically related only to the lower predicate and not to the raising verb. Thus, if I were
to adopt a framework without movement (LFG, HPSG), the learning problems remain the
same.
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c.

IP
DP
It

I

0

I

VP
V

CP

seems that

IP
John is happy

Before getting to the heart of the matter, let me rst put aside some
important problems associated with learning raising verbs that I will not
address in this paper. Two of the problems stem from the abstractness of
the lexical meanings of these verbs; the others relate to diÆculties associated
with the syntax of raising. One problem is the impoverishment of observable
information. In other words, how could you observe seeming? It should be
noted that while observation of the world is never enough to learn the meaning of any verb, as demonstrated most pointedly in Landau and Gleitman's
(1985) study of the blind child's learning of verbs (see also Gillette et al.
(1999) and arguments in Gleitman (1990)), it quite plausibly provides some
information toward the learning of some verbs. Children are keen observers
of the world around them, and they are able to draw inferences between objects and events they observe in the world and the words people use to refer
to those objects and events. On at least some occasions, a child might observe an eating event and hear the verb \eat" uttered and draw an inference
that the two are related. (For experimental evidence, see Brown (1957); also,
on-going experimental work by Je rey Lidz directly addresses the ability of
children to map novel verbs onto events.) In the case of highly abstract verbs
like seem, appear, tend and so forth, observation of the world will help even
less than usual.
Related to their abstract meaning, there may be complex cognitive factors
involved in learning the meanings of these verbs. Seem and appear may
(though need not) imply false appearance. Concepts such as false appearance
and false belief are reported to be acquired relatively late in development,
after age four or so (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Flavel, 1986; Perner et al.,
1987). These conceptual factors, thus, may add to the linguistic diÆculties
4

in acquiring these verbs. However, I will abstract away from these cognitive
factors, because even if the child has a concept of false appearance or belief,
there is still an interesting mapping problem that remains: how does the
child map the verb seem to its meaning? Moreover, not all raising predicates
have meanings associated with false appearance or belief. Predicates like
tend and used to are related to aspect, and aspectual markers and knowledge
of aspectual distinctions are observed in the grammars of children younger
than four (Wagner, 1998; Hyams, to appear).
Another issue I will not be concerned with in this paper is the possible difculty associated with acquiring a raising structure because of the structure
itself. In other words, assuming a movement-based syntactic framework, the
process of raising itself may be diÆcult to acquire for various reasons. Borer
and Wexler (1987) have argued that structures that involve A-movement
such as passives are acquired relatively late because A-chains take time to
mature. Frank (1998) has also claimed that a cluster of constructions that are
acquired late (again including passives) are acquired late precisely because
the operation of adjunction (in Tree Adjoining Grammar), which underlies
passive and other kinds of NP-movement is computationally complex and
costly. While both of these accounts o er interesting insights into possible
reasons for the lateness of acquisition of some constructions that are related
to raising, in this paper I am less concerned with accounting for why raising
verbs might be acquired late, and more concerned with accounting for how
they are acquired at all. And in fact, not all raising predicates are acquired
so late. While it is true that the verbs seem and appear are vanishingly infrequent in the speech of children younger than 5, the raising predicate used to
is used by children as young as 3 years old.2 Moreover, copular constructions
(John is a boy), which involve the same sort of NP-movement as in a seem
sentence, are produced by 2-year-olds (Becker, 2000).
In the remainder of the paper, I will focus on the problem of acquiring
(the syntactic and semantic properties of) raising predicates on the basis of
linguistic input. The next section will set up the problem of learning raising
verbs by laying out what we know about learning normal, or non-hazardous
verbs.
2 These

facts come from my own searches of the speech of 6 children in the CHILDES
database (MacWhinney and Snow, 1985).
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2 Background: Learning the meanings of verbs
Recent experimental work on verb learning indicates that language learners
exploit a variety of information sources to learn verb meanings. One source
of information children can use is the meanings of the NPs that co-occur
with a verb. If the child knows the meaning of the NP man and the meaning
of the NP cake, she might hypothesize that the unknown verb gorp means
something like \eat" or \bake", but it is unlikely to mean something like
\kiss" or \hit".
(5) The man gorped the cake
gorp ! eat, bake, #kiss, #hit
More speci cally, children have been shown to analyze the subject of a
transitive sentence as an agent, and they analyze the verb's meaning accordingly. In an experiment by Fisher et al. (1989), four-year-olds were given
a scene in which a skunk is chasing a rabbit, accompanied by one of two
sentences. Given the sentence \The skunk zarps the rabbit," all eight children said that zarp means \chase"; given the sentence \The rabbit zarps the
skunk," six of the eight children said zarp means \run away (from)". Thus,
the meanings of a verb's arguments can provide good cues to the meaning of
the verb.
Another way in which the arguments of a verb provide cues to the verb's
meaning is by their number, i.e. how many arguments a verb selects. There
are regularities in the mapping between syntax and semantics (Chomsky,
1981; Jackendo , 1983; Fisher et al., 1991) that allow a learner to draw inferences about a verb's possible meaning based on the verb's subcategorization
frame(s). For example, a verb that takes two arguments as in (5) cannot
mean something like \sleep". Formally, these regularities fall out from the
Projection Principle and the Theta Criterion: each NP argument is assigned
one and only one -role, and each -role is assigned to one and only one
argument (Chomsky, 1981). The number of -roles a verb assigns is directly
related to what the verb can and cannot mean.3
There is a large body of work, largely inspired by Landau and Gleitman (1985), showing that children exploit these regularities in the syntaxsemantics mapping of argument structure in learning about the possible
3 Please

note that the subcategorization frames of a verb will not tell a learner what
the verb does mean; rather, they perform the important function of narrowing down the
possible meanings of the verb, i.e. what the verb can and cannot mean.
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meanings of verbs. For example, Naigles (1990) showed that when children are presented with an intranstive sentence (The duck and the bunny are
gorping), they interpret the novel verb as not having a causative meaning
(they look longer at the action in which the duck and bunny are each doing
some non-causative activity, such as arm-wheeling). But if presented with
a transitive sentence (The duck is gorping the bunny), children analyze the
novel verb as having a causative sort of meaning (they look longer at the
action in which the duck is performing some causative activity on the bunny,
such as forcing the bunny to squat).
Adults make use of these regularities too. Gillette et al. (1999) showed
that when adult English-speakers are given sentences of English with one
\mystery verb" (a verb changed to a nonsense form), they are able to correctly guess the verb at least 75% of the time (they are correct on average
90% of the time when also shown an audio-less video clip of the situation in
which someone is uttering the sentences). Other evidence comes from experimental work by Kako (1998), who showed that adults can give quite speci c
and uniform predictions about what a novel verb could mean, based only on
syntactic frame, i.e. sentences in which all content words have been changed
to nonsense forms.

3 The hazards of learning seem
The reason raising verbs are so problematic for the learner is that the usual
sorts of cues and information used by learners to learn verb meanings are
impoverished in many respects. For instance, since raising verbs do not
select a subject argument, they do not stand in a semantic relationship with
the subject of the sentence.
To see why this is a problem, consider the pair of sentences in (6). The
problem with sentence (6b) is that unlike in (6a), the subject the rock is not
a plausible subject of the verb bake, since rocks are not the sort of thing that
can bake. In order for this information to be useful to a learner, the learner
must assume that the subject and the main verb stand in a local semantic
relationship to one another.
(6)

a.
The chef baked a cake.
b. ?? The rock baked a cake.

Now consider the pair in (7). The problem with (7a) is not that rocks
7

can't seem, since rocks can, for example, seem to be heavy (as in (7b)). The
semantic incompatibility in (7a) is between the rock and artichoke-liking.
Thus, the subject of (7a{b) is not in a local semantic relationship with the
main verb, but rather it is in a non-local semantic relationship with the
predicate of the lower clause.
(7)

a. ?? The rock seems [to like artichokes.]
b.
The rock seems [to be heavy.]

In other words, the learner must gure out that the subject NP is an

argument of the verb in (6) but not in (7). But perhaps the more important

consequence of this fact is that knowing something about the meaning of the
subject of a raising verb will not in any way restrict (i.e. point to or exclude)
the possible meaning of the raising verb.
The other main source of information about verb meanings comes from
the syntactic frame itself, i.e. the subcategorization frame(s) of the verb. We
hope, then, to nd good cues for the learner from this type of information.
In fact, the problem of determining the syntax of raising constructions might
not be so hard: the learner might, for instance, assume that a sentence with
the frame
(8) NPsubj hverbi [to . . . ]
contains a subject that is semantically related only to the lower predicate.
The problem with this strategy is that the learner will fail to correctly parse
a sentence containing a control verb, such as (9).
(9) John wants to be happy
The control sentence in (9) is string-identical to the raising sentence John
, but the two sentences are derived by very di erent structures. The di erence between the two structures is that the subject of (9) is
selected by want; it is assigned an (Experiencer/Agent) -role by the matrix
verb. Thus, the structure of (9) is:

seems to be happy
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(10)

IP
DP

I

0

John I

VP
V

IP

wants

PRO to be happy

where the thematic subject John is base-generated in the upper clause, and
PRO is a non-overt NP that bears its own -role.
To put the learning problem in perspective, adults should consider what
interpretation they would give to the following sentence:
(11) John gorps to be happy
What does gorp mean? Does it mean something like `seem' or something
like `want'? Is John the semantic subject (as Agent or Experiencer) of the
matrix verb, or is John the semantic subject only of the lower predicate?4
In the next section I present the results of a series of experiments designed
to nd out how a learner might gure out the structure of a sentence like
that in (11).

4 Experiments with adults
Let us focus on the question of how the language learner could distinguish
the class of raising verbs from the class of control verbs. What information
in the linguistic input could tell a learner that a particular sentence contains
one structure vs. the other, and thus one type of verb as opposed to the other
type of verb?
The general method employed in all experiments was a version of the
\human simulation" paradigm (Gillette et al., 1999). The format was to ask
4 Even

more problematic, the string in (11) is multiply ambiguous: it could also be a
purpose construction, as in John eats to be happy, or John runs to stay in shape. I will not
deal further with these constructions, but it is useful to bear in mind that the problem of
parsing a string like that in (11) is quite complex!
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adults to read a list of 40 sentences in which each sentence was missing one
word. In Experiments 1 and 2, 36 of the sentences were llers and 4 were
test items, yielding a 9:1 ller:item ratio. In Experiments 3 and 4 there were
8 test items, yielding a 4:1 ratio. The ratio was determined after piloting
indicated that the 4:1 ratio was suÆcient for the type of sentence used in
Experiments 3 and 4, but was insuÆcient for the type of sentence used in
Experiments 1 and 2 (in Experiments 1 and 2, a 4:1 ratio led participants to
guess what the \real" test items were; this was not the case for Experiments
3 and 4). In each experiment each participant saw exactly 2 exemplars of
each type of test sentence.
Participants were asked to ll in the blank with a word that would make
the sentence sound natural and were provided with the part of speech of
the missing word. Filler sentences called for nouns, adjectives, transitive or
other kinds of verbs, adverbs and modals. The di erent parts of speech were
reviewed with participants prior to the experiment, and examples were given.
Participants were told that the part of speech information was there to guide
them; if they found it distracting or otherwise unhelpful, they were free to
ignore it and ll in any word that made the sentence sound good.
Twenty subjects participated in each experiment, for a total of 100 adult
participants (50 males and 50 females); all were students or employees of the
University of Pennsylvania, and all received either course credit or payment
for their participation.
In interpreting the results, I take a participant's response to be an indication of the structure that person assigned to the sentence. Thus, given
a sentence like (11) above (but with a blank in place of gorp), if someone
writes a verb like seem in the blank, then I assume that he or she assigned
to the sentence a raising structure; if someone writes a verb like want in the
same sentence, then I assume that person assigned to the sentence a control
structure. Subjects' responses were then categorized according to whether
the response was a raising verb, a control verb, ambiguous between raising
and control (verbs like begin), or something else (e.g. a purpose construction,
etc.).5
5 In

pilot studies, participants were given sentences just like (11), i.e. containing a novel
verb, and they were asked what the novel verb meant. The problem with this methodology
was that participants frequently suggested an English word that sounded like the novel
verb, even if their suggestion did not necessarily make sense in the sentence. For this
reason, subsequent versions of the experiments used the ll-in-the-blank method.
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4.1

Experiment 1:

It vs. NP subject

We have seen that the classes of raising and control verbs overlap in the
frame in (11), repeated here in (12).
(12) John gorps to be happy.
a.
IP
DP

I

0

Johni I

VP
V
gorps

b.

IP
ti

to be happy

IP
DP

I

0

Johni I

VP
V

IP

gorps

PROi to be happy

However, there are disambiguating contexts: for example, control verbs
cannot occur with an expletive subject (*It wants that John is happy). We
might predict, then, that a sentence frame such as It hverbi that . . . would
serve as a good cue that the main verb (gorp) is a raising verb.6
In this experiment, subjects were given two kinds of test sentences: the
ambiguous frame as in (12) and the disambiguating frame, i.e. with an it
subject and a that complement. Examples are given in (13).
(13)
6 Of

a. unraised frame
It
that Barry knew the answer even before
she nished the question.

course, not all raising verbs can occur in this frame, e.g. tend,

11

used to.

b. raised frame
Barry
nished the question.

to know the answer even before she

The results of Experiment 1 are given in table 1. In this and subsequent
tables, the percent indicates the percentage of responses to a sentence type
(here: raised or unraised frame) that were raising verbs, control verbs, etc.
The number in parentheses gives the number of such responses. Columns
total to 100% (N=40).
Table 1: Responses in Raised and Unraised Frames
response type raised
(N)
Raising
32.5%* (13)
Control
52.5%** (21)
Ambiguous
15%
(6)
Other
0%***
* t(19) = 2:13; p = 0:0464
** t(19) = 4:723; p = 0:0001
*** t(19) = 6:185; p < 0:0001

unraised (N)
55%*
(22)
0%**
0%
45%*** (18)

Paired t-tests were performed on subjects' responses for each of the different types of responses, comparing the rate of each type of response in the
two sentence (frame) conditions. Thus, asterisks mark the signi cance of the
di erence between the two rates on a row in the table.
The results con rm the intuition that context (13a) is not a possible context for control verbs, as no control verbs were o ered in this sentence frame.
However, raising verbs were only marginally more frequent than \other"
kinds of verbs in the unraised frame (13a) (this di erence, between 55% and
45%, is non-signi cant; p = .6058). Moreover, the di erence between the
rate at which raising verbs were o ered in the unraised as compared to the
raised frame is only just barely signi cant (p = .0464). Thus, the unraised
(it) frame is perhaps not such a strong or unambiguous cue to a raising verb.
\Ambiguous" responses include verbs such as begin and start, which in
some cases are raising verbs (It started to rain), but in other cases are control
verbs (John started to eat a sandwich). These verbs are not grammatical in
12

the unraised frame, but they are occasionally o ered in the raised frame.
Since I am not sure I have a fool-proof way of determining when they are
used as control verbs, I have kept them separate in all tabulations. (Please
see the discussion in section 4.4.)
Some of the \other" kinds of responses subjects o ered were factive predicates, like suck, stink or help, as in (14).
(14)

a. It sucked that Diane was sick and running a fever.
b. It helped that the principal believed her excuse for being late.

Participants who o ered these responses analyzed the sentence as involving extraposition. What sets these sentences apart from true raising sentences
is that the that-clause can be fronted:
(15)

a.
That Diane was sick and running a fever sucked.
b.
That the principal believed her excuse helped.
c. * That Diane was sick and running a fever seemed.

Another kind of response was verbs like say, know or assume, verbs which
select a thematic subject argument and take a sentential complement.
(16)

a. It knew that Barry knew the answer even before she nished the
question.
b. It assumed that Barry . . .

Thus, participants who o ered this kind of response were analyzing the
it subject as a referring pronoun, not an expletive.
4.2

Experiment 2: Expletive subjects

Since an it subject is not unambiguously an expletive in the test items in
Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 I measured participants' rates of raising verb
responses in sentences with expletive subjects.

4.2.1 Experiment 2a: Expletive vs. Referential

It

In Experiment 2a I compared expletive it with referential it. Some examples
of test items are given in (17).
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(17)

a. expletive it
It
b. referential it
It

to be raining for most of the morning.
to be an uncommon shade of purple.

Results are given in table 2.
Table 2: Responses with Expletive and Referential it Subjects
response type expletive (N)
Raising
85%*
(34)
Control
0%
Ambiguous
10%
(4)
Other
5%**
(2)
* t(19) = 3:943; p = 0:0009
** t(19) = 2:666; p = 0:0153

referential (N)
55%*
(22)
7.5%
(3)
15%
(6)
22.5%**
(9)

There were only a few responses to sentences with expletive it that were
not raising verbs. A few of these were ambiguous, e.g. begin (here they were
surely raising verbs, but as with the other experiments, I kept these verbs
separate). Two responses were ungrammatical: participants gave a modal
verb instead of a main verb, shown in (18).
(18)

a. It
b. It

will to be too foggy to drive safely.
may to be too foggy to drive safely.

In a previous version of this experiment, other ungrammatical responses
were o ered:
(19)

a. It
b. It
c. It

pays to be sunny.
rocks to be sunny.
sucks to be raining.

In sentences in which the subject was referential it, just over half of the
responses were raising verbs. A large portion of the responses fell into the
\other" category, exempli ed here:
14

(20)

a. It scrambled to scurry along the edge of the eld, as if pursued
by something.
b. It paid to have stripes, polka-dots and very pointy horns.
c. It sucked to have stripes, polka-dots and very pointy horns.

Thus, the results of Experiment 2a show that expletive it almost unambiguously yields a raising verb response. As in Experiment 1, an it subject
that is not (or not necessarily) an expletive prompts a raising verb response
only a little more than half of the time (55% in both experiments).

4.2.2 Experiment 2b: vs.
It

There

Unlike it, there is not lexically ambiguous between an expletive and a referential pronoun. It's true that there has a life as a non-expletive, in its so-called
deictic use (John's over THERE). But deictic there di ers from expletive
there in various ways: it is not obligatorily sentence-initial, it can be stressed
(Oh, THERE's my book), it does not always trigger subject-aux inversion, in
particular with pronoun subjects (THERE they are, *THERE are they), and
it has no de niteness e ects, unlike expletive (existential) there. We don't
nd these sorts of di erences between expletive and referential it. Therefore,
we might expect expletive there to serve as an even better cue to raising verbs
than expletive it. This is what I investigated in Experiment 2b.
Some examples of test items are given in (21).
(21)

a. It
b. There
the situation.

to be raining for most of the morning.
to be no end to his complaints about

The results are given in table 3.
Table 3: Responses to Sentences with Expletive It and There
response type
Raising
Control
Ambiguous
Other

(N) there (N)
90% (36) 97.5% (39)
0%
0%
5%
(2) 0%
5%
(2) 2.5%
(1)
it

15

Indeed, expletive there is a near-perfect indicator that the main verb is a
raising verb, although there is not a signi cant di erence between the rate
of raising verb responses to expletive it and there in this experiment. The
single \other" (non-raising) response to a there sentence is given in (22).
(22) There
ered.
4.3

was laughter to follow a long silence among the people gath-

Experiment 3: Predicate Eventivity

Experiment 2 showed that adults can identify raising verbs on the basis of
sentence frame information (i.e. occurrence with an expletive).7 But returning to our original problem, the learner has to determine the structure of the
ambiguous frame John gorped to be happy on the basis of string input. There
is evidence that children reason across frames (Naigles et al., 1989; Naigles,
1996) and might be able to use information about a verb's occurrence with
an expletive to make a guess about that verb's syntactic properties upon
hearing it in another frame. Even so, it would still be nice if there were
information from the single ambiguous frame to suggest to a learner that the
structure is a raising or a control structure. Is there such information?
In section 1 I claimed that raising verbs don't select any arguments, and
this is true. But they do select something: they select a propositional complement. And certain raising verbs appear to have preferences about some
aspects of that complement. In particular, some raising verbs prefer a stative
predicate inside their complement, as opposed to an eventive one.8
(23)

a. ?? John seems to eat an apple (right now).
b.
John seems to be eating an apple (right now).
c.
John seems to know the answer (right now).

In this experiment, I gave participants the ambiguous sentence frame but
manipulated the eventivity of the lower predicate. There are di erent kinds

important caveats should be borne in mind: rst, as we saw, it is ambiguous
between being an expletive and a referential pronoun. Second, even in the case of there,
which I consider unambiguous|or more easily disambiguated than it|expletives provide
useful cues only to the extent that they are known to be expletives. That is, the learner
must have rst learned that English has expletives and that it and there are expletives.
8 I don't think this relation should properly be considered a case of selection. But I'm
not sure what to call it.
7 Two
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of stative predicates: an eventive verb put in the progressive becomes stative,
and there are bare stative predicates that denote mental or physical states.
I gave participants exemplars of each type. First let us contrast just bare
eventive verbs with their progressive counterparts.
(24)

a. bare eventive
James
with cole slaw.
b. progressive (stative)
James
wich with cole slaw.

to eat a triple-decker club sandwich
to be eating a triple-decker club sand-

Results are given in table 4.
Table 4: Responses to Ambiguous Frame with Eventive/Progressive Predicate
response type eventive (N)
Raising
2.5%*
(1)
Control
60%
(24)
Ambiguous
30%
(12)
Other
7.5%
(3)
*t(19) = 4:682; p  0:001

progressive (N)
40%*
(16)
52.5%
(21)
5%
(2)
2.5%
(1)

In fact, subjects gave almost no raising verbs as responses when the lower
predicate was eventive (to eat), but gave a raising verb 40% of the time when
it was stative (to be eating). As mentioned above, in addition to testing
responses to progressive verbs, in the same experiment I also gave sentences
in which the downstairs predicate contained a bare stative predicate such as
know or love. In those items the predicate varied between denoting a mental
state (know, love) or a physical state (be tall, be sick). The responses to those
items are given in table 5.
Although subjects o ered a raising verb signi cantly more often given a
stative lower predicate than an eventive lower predicate, they still o ered a
control verb more often than a raising verb in all sentence types. But in all
of the test items the subject was animate. Animate things have volition and
intention, so they are capable of wanting and trying. Inanimate things are
17

Table 5: Responses to Ambiguous Frame with Stative Predicates
response type mental state (N) physical state (N)
Raising
37.5%
(15) 22.5%
(9)
Control
55%
(22) 65%
(26)
Ambiguous
7.5%
(3) 7.5%
(3)
Other
0%
5%
(2)
(No di erences between columns were signi cant.)
not. In the nal experiment, I manipulated both the animacy of the subject
and the eventivity of the lower predicate.
4.4

Experiment 4: Animacy



Eventivity

Examples of the test sentences given in Experiment 4 are given in (25-26).
Unlike the other experiments, this one had a 22 design; each participant
saw two sentences of each type, and there were four types.
(25)

(26)

Animate subject

a. eventive
The driver
b. stative
His campaign manager
for the mayoral candidate.

to hit the car.
to remain a problem

Inanimate subject

a. eventive
The boulder
b. stative
The extramarital a air
for the mayoral candidate.

to hit the car.
to remain a problem

In viewing the results of this experiment, let us rst look only at the
subject animacy factor and collapse across predicate type. These data are
shown in table 6.
These results indicate that an animate subject yields more control verbs
than raising verbs, and an inanimate subject yields more raising verbs than
18

Table 6: Responses to Ambiguous Frame with Animate vs. Inanimate Subject
response type animate (N)
Raising
18.75%* (15)
Control
52.5%** (42)
Ambiguous
17.5%
(14)
Other
11.25%
(9)
* t(19) = 4:359; p  0:003;
** t(19) = 7:054; p < 0:0001

inanimate
43.75%*
17.5%**
23.75%
15%

(N)
(35)
(14)
(19)
(12)

control verbs (there was a signi cant main e ect of subject for raising and
control verb responses). But let us now break down the results according to
both subject type (animacy) and predicate type (eventivity). These gures
are given in table 7.
Table 7: Responses by Subject Animacy and Predicate Eventivity
response type

animate subject
inanimate subject
eventive
stative
eventive
stative
Raising
5% (2) 32.5% (13) 17.5% (7) 70% (28)
Control
65% (26) 40% (16) 32.5% (13) 2.5% (1)
Ambiguous
15% (6)
20% (8)
25% (10) 22.5% (9)
Other
15% (6)
7.5% (3)
25% (10)
5% (2)
Sig. interaction only for raising verb responses (p = 0:0375)
As in Experiment 3, when the subject is animate, an eventive lower predicate yields almost no raising verbs, while a stative lower predicate yields
some (around 30%). But when we look at sentences with an inanimate subject, we see an interesting outcome: an eventive lower predicate still yields
less than 18% raising verb responses, while a stative lower predicate yields
a full 70%. Thus, it is not simply the animacy of the subject that a ects
the proportion of raising verb responses, as would be apparent from table 6,
rather the combination of an inanimate subject and a stative lower predicate
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provides a strong cue that the sentence is likely to be a raising sentence.9
In addition to raising and control verb responses, there were quite a number of \ambiguous" responses as well as \others". Recall that the ambiguous
responses are those like begin, start and so forth which may function either as
raising or as control verbs. Interestingly, Perlmutter (1979) argues that these
verbs are raising verbs when the subject is inanimate, but control verbs when
the subject is animate. For instance, John might be said to be a \beginner"
in (27a) (and thus a controller for PRO), but the water could not really be
said to be a \beginner" in (27b).
(27)

a. John began to write a paper.
b. Water began to gush from the sewer.

If this is true, then the ambiguous responses in sentences with an inanimate subject should be added to the tally of raising verb responses, while the
ambiguous responses in sentences with an animate subject should be added
to the tally of control verb responses. This division of responses would yield
the following picture.
Table 8: Redistributing \Ambiguous" Responses
response type animate subject
event. stat.
Raising
5%
32.5%
Control
60%
Other
15%
7.5%

80%

inanimate subject
event.
stat.
42.5%
32.5%
2.5%
25%
5%

92.5%

Reassigning the ambiguous responses in this way has the e ect of making
an animate subject plus eventive predicate a very good cue to a control verb,
and an inanimate subject plus stative predicate a very good cue to a raising verb|in fact, the inanimate subject plus stative predicate combination
appears to rival an expletive it subject as a cue to a raising verb.
It may be hasty, however, to reassign the ambiguous responses based
solely on the criterion of subject animacy. There were cases in which I believe
9 Note

also that the signi cant interaction between the two factors shows that the e ect
is not merely additive.
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the sentence is truly ambiguous, and we cannot determine the exact structure
the participant had in mind. Some examples illustrate:
(28)

proved

a. His campaign manager
to remain a problem for the mayoral candidate.
b. The driver
to hit the car on the passenger's side.

had

I think the sense of prove in (28a) that is most likely intended is the
raising sense: \the manager turned out to remain . . . ", and yet the subject
is animate (campaign manager). Similarly, the sense of have in (28b) that
is most probable is the sense of non-controlled necessity, i.e. the driver was
forced (e.g. by the way in which the accident unfolded) to hit the car on the
passenger's side. However, it is possible that the participant intended the
meaning of have such that the driver had some internal necessity or desire
to hit the car on the passenger's side. Of course, it is the sentences with
an animate subject that remain truly ambiguous in this way; if inanimate
things cannot be the subject of a control predicate, then it may be safe to
lump the ambiguous responses with raising responses for those items. But
for the sentences with an animate subject, I think it is best at this point to
keep such responses separate.
Almost two-thirds of the \other" responses in this experiment were purpose verbs (e.g. The boulder dropped to hit the car . . . ), there were two null
responses, and the remaining third or so were either ungrammatical or nonsensical (e.g. The salesman languished to advertise a new product). Certain
passives were included in this category if they could not occur naturally with
an expletive subject (e.g. Amy was forced to depend on Eric . . . , cf. ?*It
was forced to rain; ?*There was forced to be a resolution).
In summary, (in)animacy is a strong cue, but it is not de nitive: an
inanimate subject paired with an eventive predicate still evokes a raising
verb response only 17% of the time; less frequently than it evokes a control
verb response. The reason for the animacy e ect is intuitively clear: control
verbs imply desire (want), e ort (try), or some other agentive/experiential
property of the subject, and inanimate objects don't have those properties.
What's puzzling though is why inanimate subjects strongly cue a raising verb
only when the lower predicate is stative.
It is, in fact, puzzling that eventivity matters so much. Although I do
not have a good answer for why this is, I suspect it is due to an interaction
between the aspect of the matrix clause and that of the embedded clause.
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Certain matrix clause verbs have preferences as to whether the embedded
predicate can be eventive or stative:
(29)
(30)

a.
I saw John drunk.
b. * I watched John drunk.
a. I saw John eat a banana.
b. I watched John eat a banana.

Watch appears to require its embedded clause predicate to be eventive
(it's unclear whether this is due to watch itself being eventive), while see
places no such restriction. Raising verbs appear to require a stative downstairs predicate, or they require that an eventive predicate have a habitual
meaning:

(31)

a. It seems to be raining/??rain (right now).
b. It appears to be raining/??rain (right now).
c. It tends to rain (on Tuesdays).

Want

predicate.
(32)

doesn't seem to have this restriction, but

try

prefers an eventive

a. John wants to eat an apple (right now)/be tall.
b. John is trying to eat an apple (right now)/(?)like math.

The nature of the relationship between raising and control verbs and the
aspect of their lower predicates is something that should be further investigated in the future.
4.5

Summary of Experiments

The purpose of the experiments reported here was to nd out what cues
are available from sentences to suggest to a learner that the main verb of
the sentence might be a raising verb. Of course, the \learners" in these
experiments were not actual language learners but rather adult speakers of
English. Nevertheless, adult intuitions have proven to be helpful indicators
of the intuitions real (child) learners might have about the meanings of novel
verbs (Gillette et al., 1999). Though surely not the whole story, I take this
approach to be a good starting point for these kinds of investigations into
language learning.
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The experiments showed that there are a couple di erent kinds of cues
that point to raising verbs or a raising structure. As we saw in section 4.1,
raising verbs can be distinguished from control verbs by the frame of the
sentence: (most) raising verbs can occur in the frame It hverbi that . . . ,
while control verbs cannot. However, Experiment 1 showed that this frame
provides only a moderate cue: raising verbs were o ered as a response to ll
in the blank only marginally signi cantly more than in the ambiguous frame.
Thus, this frame does not strongly cue a raising verb response, because there
are non-raising verbs that are compatible with this frame (e.g. It knew that
. . . /It helped that . . . ).
Experiment 2 showed that expletive subjects (weather it and there) serve
as strong cues that the sentence involves a raising verb. This is hopeful, but
it requires that the learner know that they are expletives. In answering the
question of how a child might know that something is an expletive, we risk
falling into the circular argument that \they know it's an expletive because
it occurs with raising predicates." At this point, I will leave this as a caveat
(and see discussion of on-going work in section 5.2).
Apart from sentence frame, there are cues within an ambiguous string
(NP hverbi to . . . ) to indicate that the sentence might involve a raising verb
(and therefore a raising structure). Experiment 3 showed that the aspect of
the lower predicate (whether the predicate in the lower clause was stative or
eventive) a ected the choice of the main verb: when the lower predicate was
eventive, virtually no raising verbs were o ered (only 1 out of a possible 40)10 ;
when the lower predicate was stative, raising verbs were o ered between
22.5% and 40% of the time. It is unclear exactly why this is so, but it appears
to follow from a dispreference that certain raising verbs have for occurring
with an eventive downstairs predicate (John seems to ??eat/be eating . . . ).
This relationship between the choice of raising vs. control verbs in the
main clause and the eventivity vs. stativity of the lower clause was seen in
Experiment 4 to interact in an interesting way with the animacy of the main
clause subject. In brief, an inanimate subject paired with a stative predicate
yields a high rate of raising verb responses, and an animate subject paired
with an eventive predicate yields a high rate of control verb responses, while
neither inanimacy nor stativity alone evokes raising verbs more than 50% of
the time.
What is remarkable about this interaction is that since raising verbs do
10 In

a previous run of this experiment, no raising verbs were o ered in this condition.
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Table 9: Summary of Responses in Experiment 4
animate
inanimate

eventive

stative

control verbs

mixed

mixed

raising verbs

not actually select anything (other than a propositional complement), raising
verbs cannot select an inanimate subject. The raising verb does not stand in
any sort of semantic relationship with that subject at all. Nevertheless there
is a kind of \negative" selection: control verbs, by virtue of their meaning,
generally require a sentient subject and therefore cannot normally select an
inanimate subject.11
If we can use the adult data as a suggestion about what cues a child learner
might notice and exploit, there are potential cues in the syntax of certain
constructions to lead a learner to think that a sentence involves a raising
verb (expletive subjects), and there are cues in the semantics of syntactically
ambiguous sentences as to whether the sentence is likely to be a raising or a
control structure (subject animacy, predicate eventivity). The next question
is at what age children attend to these very cues.

5 Conclusions and Further Directions
Before getting into the ways in which this work can be extended, let us come
back to the question we started with: how do children learn the meanings of
raising verbs? We saw that the best hope for learning to identify the class
of raising verbs is via the syntax of the constructions in which these verbs
occur. The rest of the paper dealt with why that path itself is tricky and
suggestions were made, on the basis of experiments with adults, for how a
learner might go about solving the syntactic puzzle. But let's say that the
learner achieves all that: the learner is able to gure out what the expletives
11 Please

note that there are counterexamples to this generalization, few though they are.
The verb serve can take an inanimate subject in a control structure, as in This pamphlet
serves to dictate the rules of proper behavior in the oÆce. Other counterexamples are
suÆce, deserve and fail (Rudanko, 1989), although I consistently counted the response
fail as ambiguous since it can also be a raising verb (There failed to be any resolution). I
thank Carson Schutze for discussion on this issue.
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in the language are and to use subject animacy and predicate eventivity as
cues that a potentially ambiguous string has a raising or a control structure.
Then what? How can this knowledge lead the learner to gure out the
abstract meanings of raising verbs?
I propose that the answer lies in the Theta Criterion: if a verb does
not select any NP arguments and can occur with expletive and inanimate
subjects, then its meaning cannot have to do with desire or e ort or decision
(things that require a sentient being as experiencer). Instead, the verb should
have the sort of meaning that modal or auxiliary verbs do: it should mean
something about aspect (cf. tend, used to), evidentiality (cf. seem, appear),
or it should qualify a state of a airs (cf. happen to, be likely, turn out). How
a learner gures out the precise meanings of these verbs I don't know, but
I would venture that we are not in a position to say how a child learns the
precise meaning of any verb.
There are various ways in which this work can be continued. Perhaps the
least urgent (and probably the simplest) is to do further manipulations with
adults. One could, for example, give adults a sequence of sentences (rather
than individual, unrelated sentences), and ask them to ll in the same word
in each sentence. One could vary the sentence frames through the series and
measure how their guesses change at each sentence, or measure how long it
takes them to come up with a raising verb. A more urgent, and probably more
interesting route to take is to study children (the \real" learners) directly.
How should we investigate children's knowledge and learning of raising
verbs? The experiments with adults tell us that (at least) two things are
important in identifying raising verbs: expletive subjects, and inanimate
subjects paired with stative downstairs predicates. Thus, some rst steps
would be to examine children's understanding of expletives, and their interpretations of inanimate subjects as subjects of control verbs.
At present I have begun two studies with children to examine exactly
these things. Neither study is complete, so here I report only the preliminary
results.
5.1

Experiment 1: Animacy

Recall that in a raising structure the main clause subject is semantically
related only to the lower predicate, while in a control structure the main
clause subject is semantically related to both the main clause and lower
predicates. Thus, perhaps a good learning strategy would be to rst pay
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attention to that long-distance semantic relationship (and possibly ignore
the local semantic relationship between the main clause verb and subject).
This strategy would be good in allowing the learner to correctly parse raising
sentences, and it would not harm the parsing of control sentences since the
long-distance semantic relationship matters for control sentences too.12 Then
at a certain point the learner will need to distinguish raising from control
structures, and so at that point the learner will need to pay attention also
to the semantic relationship between the main clause verb and the main
clause subject (i.e. the local relationship). This will help distinguish raising
from control sentences, because in raising sentences there is no semantic
relationship between the verb and subject in the main clause, but in control
sentences there is. One measure of attention to this relationship, then, would
be rejection of inanimate subjects as subjects of control verbs.
In short, this experiment is designed to examine children's interpretation
of the semantic relationship between the main clause subject and the upstairs
and downstairs predicates in raising and control sentences, and to nd out
whether children allow inanimate subjects to be subjects of control verbs
(and at what age they stop allowing this relation).13
The method employed is a version of the Grammaticality Judgment task
(De Villiers and De Villiers, 1974; McDaniel and Cairns, 1990). Children are
shown a series of pictures, a puppet comments on each picture, and the child
is asked to judge the puppet's comment to be \good" (acceptable) or \silly".
Some examples of target items are given in (33). In each target sentence, the
main clause subject is inanimate, and it is either compatible or incompatible
(semantically) with the lower predicate. Children were given 8 test sentences
(4 raising and 4 control) plus 8 ller sentences.
(33)

a.
b.
c.
d.

The door is trying to be purple.
The door is trying to be friendly.
The hay seems to be on the ground.
The hay seems to be excited.

(compatible)
(incompatible)
(compatible)
(incompatible)

Thus, all control sentences are \silly" because all contain inanimate subjects (cf. (33a): doors can be purple, they just can't try to be purple; doors
can neither be friendly nor try to be friendly). Half of the raising sentences
12 Thanks to Robin Clark for discussion about this point.
13 N.B. Throughout this section, I use the term \control sentence"

with a control structure/control verb, not an experiment control.
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to mean a sentence

are \silly" and half are \good". The reason for including both compatible
and incompatible predicates for the control sentences is to nd out whether
the child is attending to the local or non-local semantic relationship. Whenever a child judged a sentence to be silly, the child was asked why it was silly.
This allows us to determine, on the basis of the child's reasoning, whether
she had rejected it because of incompability with the control verb itself (the
upstairs verb) or with the downstairs predicate. So as not to bias children
to answer \silly" all the time, most of the ller sentences were \good", and
some of the llers were control sentences with animate subjects. Each child
completed four practice items before beginning the experiment.
I have grouped the children into three groups, roughly by age. The mean
performance (% correct) for raising and control sentences is given in table
10.
Table 10: Percent Correct for Raising and Control Sentences
% correct
mean age (N) raising
control
a
5;5 (5)
95.8
95.8a
b
4;9 (7)
87.5
83.3c
3;3 (5)
70d
20e
a
t(4) = 9:0; p = 0:008; b t(5) = 4:332; p = 0:0075
c t(5) = 6:708; p = 0:0011; d t(4) = 2:40; p = 0:0743
e t(4) = 2:236; p = 0:0890
There is some variation across the di erent age groups in the proportion of
correct responses to raising sentences (the older children performing better),
but all children performed quite well. However, with the control sentences
only the 4- and 5-year-olds were more than 50% correct. The performance of
the 3-year-olds is almost, but not quite, signi cantly di erent from chance,
while the 4- and 5-year-olds are signi cantly above chance for both raising
and control sentences. However, given that the study is not complete and
sample size is accordingly quite low, we should not place too much weight
on signi cance at this point.
Turning now the the children's interpretations of control sentences, the
most interesting test items are the ones in which the main clause subject is
compatible with the lower clause predicate: these sentences should be rejected
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if children are paying attention to the relationship between the main clause
verb (the control verb) and the main clause subject. If children are instead
paying attention only to the long-distance relationship between the subject
and the lower clause predicate, they should accept the sentence. Thus, the
predictions for responses to a sentence like The door is trying to be purple
are summarized in table 11.
Table 11: Predictions for Control Sentences
if child attends to . . .
door{try
door{purple

response should be . . .
reject
accept

Moreover, the reason children give for their rejection of a sentence should
indicate that they rejected the sentence because of an incompatibility between the subject and the control verb (e.g. \Doors can't try to do anything"). The result of this analysis of the data reveals an interesting pattern.
Table 12: Attention to Compatibility with Upstairs vs. Downstairs Predicate
mean age door{try door{be purple unclear
5;5
90%
0%
10%
4;9
42.9%
42.9%
14.3%
3;3
0%
100%
0%
Children in the 5-year-old group uniformly attend to the relationship
between the subject and the control verb, thus rejecting these sentences for
an appropriate reason 90% of the time.14 Children in the 3-year-old group
uniformly attend to the relationship between the subject and the downstairs
predicate, incorrectly accepting these sentences 100% of the time. Children
in the 4-year-old group show a mixed pattern, attending to the subject's
relationship with the downstairs predicate and with the upstairs predicate
each 42.9% of the time.
Some examples of children's responses follow:
14 The

one \unclear" response by a 5-year-old was correct (i.e. she rejected the sentence),
but the reason for her rejection was not clear from her response.
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(34)

a. # The door is trying to be purple
! \No, because you have to paint it" (age 5;6)
b. # The bucket wants to be in the sandbox
! \No, because [buckets] can't move unless somebody carries
them" (age 5;4)

(35) # The door is trying to be purple
! \Good." (age 3;4)
Sometimes children (especially in the 4-year-old group) correctly rejected
a sentence like (34a/b) but did so for an alternative reason, as seen in the
following exchange:
(36) Puppet:
The ower wants to be pink.
Child (4;1):
Silly. It already IS pink!
Experimenter: Well, could it want to be another color?
Child:
Yeah.
These responses were counted as indicating attention to the relationship
between the subject and the lower predicate, because the child stated that
the ower (or door) could want or try to do something (be another color).
Not all children responded this way, even those who were not sure exactly
why owers or doors could not want or try to do anything:
(37) Puppet:
The ower wants to be pink.
Child (4;8):
Silly, because the ower IS pink!
Experimenter: Well, could it want to be another color?
Child:
No.
Experimenter: How come?
Child:
I don't know.
From these preliminary data, it appears that until almost age 5, children (at least sometimes) permit an inanimate thing to be the subject of a
control verb. This could support the hypothesis that children are attending
only to the semantic relationship between the subject and the downstairs
predicate and are ignoring its relationship to the upstairs predicate. It could
also mean that children until about age 5 do not know that inanimate things
cannot have volition or make e ort. It is unlikely that these 4-year-olds fail
to understand the di erence between animate and inanimate things. Experimental work by Spelke et al. (1995) (and work cited there) indicates that
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infants as young as 7 months of age appreciate central di erences between
inanimate objects and people (for example that people are self-propelled but
inanimate objects are not) and reason di erently about the behavior of animate vs. inanimate things. By age 2;6 children understand that people have
intentions and that their actions are often goal-directed. What is less certain
at this point is at what age children understand that inanimate things do
not have intentions. That is, children know that inanimate things do not
typically cause events to occur, but it is diÆcult to test conclusively for the
knowledge that inanimate things do not have intentions (C. Massey, personal
communication). Thus, although children understand many important differences between inanimate and animate things well before age 5, there may
still be some conceptual di erences that are acquired later in development.
5.2

Experiment 2

The second experiment is aimed at nding out at what age children discriminate between expletive and referential it. The method is a version of the
Truth-Value Judgment task (Crain and McKee, 1985). Two characters are
introduced, a bird and a dinosaur. The dinosaur is blindfolded so that it
cannot see anything. The bird and the dinosaur (who, the child is told, argue a lot) have to identify a series of small plastic shapes. The bird is always
right (since the bird can see), and the dinosaur is always wrong (since it can't
see, so it has to guess). The bird and dinosaur are consistently referred to
either by the NP labels (the bird, the dinosaur) or by the pronoun it. Finally,
when they are done arguing, the puppet makes a statement about what just
happened, and the child's task is to respond to the puppet's comment. Here
is an example:
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(38)

Experimenter:
Bird:
Experimenter:
Dinosaur:
Bird:
Dinosaur:
Experimenter:

hShape is a stari

Let's ask the bird what IT thinks that is.
Chirp chirp! It's a star!
Let's ask the dinosaur what IT thinks.
(touches the side of it) I think it's a ball.
No! It's a star!
No! It's a ball! (continues)
Let's ask the puppet what just happened.

p

Puppet:
I know! It chirped to the dinosaur that it was a star. ( )
|or|
Puppet:
I know! It seemed to the dinosaur that it was a star. ()
There were a total of 8 test sentences (and no llers), 4 seem sentences
and 4 chirp sentences. The test items were balanced so that for 2 of the
seem sentences the correct answer was \yes" and for 2 of them the correct
answer was \no"; the same for the chirp sentences. Items were presented in
a pseudo-random order.
Half of the children received the sentences as above, and half received an
alternative to the \chirp" sentence, namely, It said to the dinosaur that the
shape was a star. The experiment was originally piloted using the sentence
It said to the dinosaur that it was a star. But there was concern that this
sentence does not contrast enough with the seem sentence. Thus, the reason
for using the chirp sentence was to use a more noticeable word than say, and
the reason for spelling out the noun phrase the shape in the other version
was to discourage children from analyzing the rst it as referring to the
shape itself (as opposed to the bird). (Only one child out of 16 consistently
analyzed the it subject as referring to the shape: that child rejected all four
of the say sentences and her reason was always \Stars [etc.] can't talk".)15
With so little data statistical tests are not especially meaningful, but
the responses of the 5-year-olds for both kinds of sentences are signi cantly
above chance, and the responses of the 4-year-olds to the seem sentences are
likewise above chance. The 4-year-olds' responses to the say/chirp sentences
are at chance (p = 0:7), and there is not enough data for the 3-year-olds to
determine signi cance (but they are correct over 50% of the time).
15 The

same children participated in this experiment as in the animacy experiment.
However, one 3-year-old child who completed the animacy experiment did not comprehend
this task and did not complete it.
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Table 13: Percent Correct Responses in Expletives Task
% correct
mean age (N) chirp/say seem
5;5 (5)
70a
77.8b
4;9 (7)
55.6
75c
3;3 (4)
73.3
73.3
a
t(4) = 3:14; p < 0:05
b
t(4) = 2:83; p < 0:05
c t(6) = 2:65; p < 0:05
It is interesting that the group with the lowest percentage correct are the
4-year-olds for the chirp/say items. In fact three of the 4-year-olds showed a
consistent pattern of responding correctly to the seem items but incorrectly
to the say/chirp items. Their incorrect response was not a failure to respond,
rather they responded as if the puppet's sentence had been It seemed to the
dinosaur that . . . , thus they gave what would have been a correct response
if the sentence had been a seem sentence. My hunch as to why they do this
is that these children have parsed the sentence analyzing it as an expletive,
rather than as a referring pronoun. If they parse it as an expletive, then
whatever verb occurs with the expletive could not mean something like say
or chirp; it would have to mean something like seem. Further work on this is
certainly required to nd out exactly what children's interpretations of these
sentences are.
Given the preliminary nature of these data, it is impossible to draw any
strong conclusions. However, I believe they are suggestive of a few things.
First, they suggest that three-year-olds consistently attend only to the semantic relationship between the upstairs subject and the downstairs predicate in sentences with an in nitive complement (or that 3-year-olds believe
that inanimate things can have intentions), and that only after age 5 do children consistently attend also to the relationship between the upstairs subject
and upstairs predicate (control verb). Secondly, they suggest that 3- and 4year-olds do not show much (if any) diÆculty interpreting raising sentences.
Children as young as 3 are correct on average 70% of the time in judging
the acceptability of raising sentences (The bicycle seems to be small/*sad).
Young children also give evidence of comprehending sentences containing ex32

pletive it plus seem, and some of these children show evidence of correctly
distinguishing expletive it from referential it (one child aged 3;4 was 100%
correct on all chirp and seem items in the second experiment). But these
interim results raise at least as many questions: do young children merely
appear to comprehend raising sentences but instead are simply parsing the
upstairs subject and lower predicate, without even parsing the raising verb?
Are they doing the same thing with control sentences (hence the apparent
lack of attention to the relationship between the subject and main clause
verb)? Why do some of the 4-year-olds consistently misinterpret sentences
like It said to the dinosaur that . . . ? Hopefully further work will shed light
on these questions, and provide more answers as to how children learn raising
verbs.

References
Becker, Misha. 2000. The development of the copula in child English: The
lightness of be. Doctoral Dissertation, UCLA.
Borer, Hagit, and Kenneth Wexler. 1987. The maturation of syntax. In
Parameter setting , ed. Thomas Roeper and Edwin Williams. Dordrecht:
Reidel.
Brown, Roger. 1957. Linguistic determinism and parts of speech.
Abnormal and Social Psychology 55:1{5.
Chomsky, Noam. 1981. Lectures on government
tures . New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Journal of

and binding: The Pisa lec-

Crain, Stephen, and Cecile McKee. 1985. The acquisition of structural restrictions on anaphora. In Proceedings of NELS 15 , ed. S. Berman, J. Choe,
and J. McDonough. Amherst, MA: GLSA.
De Villiers, Jill G., and Peter A. De Villiers. 1974. Competence and performance in child language: Are children really competent to judge? Journal
of Child Language 1:11{22.
Fisher, Cynthia, Henry Gleitman, and Lila R. Gleitman. 1991. On the semantic content of subcategorization frames. Cognitive Psychology 23:331{392.
33

Fisher, Cynthia, Geo rey Hall, Susan Rakowitz, and Lila Gleitman. 1989.
Verb-meaning acquisition is guided by syntactic evidence. Unpublished
manuscript, University of Pennsylvania.
Flavel, J. 1986. The development of children's knowledge about the
appearance-reality distinction. American Psychologist 41:418{425.
Frank, Robert. 1998. Structural complexity and the time course of grammatical development. Cognition 66:249{301.
Gillette, Jane, Henry Gleitman, Lila Gleitman, and Anne Lederer. 1999.
Human simulations of vocabulary learning. Cognition 73:135{176.
Gleitman, Lila. 1990. The structural sources of verb meanings.
Acquisition 1:3{55.

Language

Hyams, Nina. to appear. Clausal structure in child Greek: A reply to Varlokosta, Vainikka and Rohrbacher and a reanalysis. The Linguistic Review
.
Jackendo , Ray. 1983. Semantics and cognition . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kako, Edward. 1998. The event semantics of syntactic structures. Doctoral
Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.
Landau, Barbara, and Lila R. Gleitman. 1985. Language and experience:
Evidence from the blind child . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
MacWhinney, Brian, and Catherine Snow. 1985. The child language data
exchange system. Journal of Child Language 12:271{296.
McDaniel, Dana, and Helen Smith Cairns. 1990. The child as informant:
Eliciting intuitions from young children. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 19:331{344.
Naigles, Letitia. 1990. Children use syntax to learn verb meanings.
of Child Language 17:357{374.

Journal

Naigles, Letitia. 1996. The use of multiple frames in verb learning via syntactic bootstrapping. Cognition 58:221{251.

34

Naigles, Letitia, Henry Gleitman, and Lila R. Gleitman. 1989. Syntactic
bootstrapping in verb acquisition: Evidence from comprehension. In Language and cognition: A developmental perspective , ed. E. Drom. Norwood,
NJ: Ablex.
Perlmutter, David M. 1979. The two verbs begin. In Syntactic argumentation , ed. Donna Jo Napoli and Emily Norwood Rando. Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press.
Perner, J., S. Leekam, and H. Wimmer. 1987. Three-year-olds' diÆculty
with false belief: The case for a conceptual de cit. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology 5:125{137.
Rudanko, J. 1989.

Complementation and case grammar:

A syntactic and

semantic study of selected patterns of complementation in present-day English

. New York: State University of New York Press.

Spelke, Elizabeth S., Ann Phillips, and Amanda L. Woodward. 1995. Infants'
knowledge of object motion and human action. In Causal cognition: A
multidisciplinary debate , ed. Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann James
Premack. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wagner, Laura. 1998. The semantics and acquisition of time in language.
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.
Wimmer, H., and J. Perner. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and
constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding
of deception. Cognition 13:103{128.

35

